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ABSTRACT
One of the most interesting aspects of nuclear power is the perceived risk that the public
infers from its existence. This paper explores the public's response to risk in general and
specifically to nuclear power by reviewing behavioral studies examining how risk is
perceived. The paper also discusses important themes relevant to nuclear power and risk
perception, including trust, stigma, the difference between experts and the public, and
ways of informing and educating the public. The current political status of nuclear power
is discussed by examining the roles and opinions of three groups dealing with nuclear
energy: 1) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2) the nuclear energy industry, and 3)
experts in the field of nuclear power and environmentalists who are concerned with the
subject. Finally, conclusions are drawn based on the research into the public's perception
of risk and the current status of nuclear energy in order to develop suggestions that may
aide in the development of nuclear technology and a resurgence of nuclear power, while
addressing the public's concerns and furthering the public's understanding of nuclear
technology.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard Lester
Title: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
Director, Industrial Performance Center

1. Introduction:
For years, the nuclear community has had to combat the fears of the public in
order to secure a place for nuclear energy in the future, fighting a negative image that
resulted in significant part from the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. To the
public, nuclear power has often been seen as too dangerous and too risky. However, the
public does not perceive risk in the same way that it is perceived by the engineers in
charge of such systems as nuclear power plants.
To come up with a formulation of overall risk, engineers use a model consisting
of the probability of an accident occurring per unit time multiplied by the number of
fatalities that accident would cause. In this formulation, systems with the same product
of probability and consequence have the same risk. Thus, for example, engineers would
see a system with a low probability of failure with high casualties as having the same risk
a system with a very high probability of a low casualty event.
There are many other factors that influence public opinion. Some of these include
qualitative measures of things like "dread" and "fear", and were studied in the late 1970s
with several articles published on the matter. These studies point to a definite distinction
between different systems in the public's mind, where a system with high casualties and
low probability is seen as more risky than those with low casualties and a higher
probability. An example of this is the common fear of airplane crashes, while automobile
fatalities are accepted.
The goal of the thesis will be to analyze the different ways engineers and the
public approach risk, and the implications that these differences have for technology as a
whole, specifically nuclear power. These results will be relevant to the way that
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industries, especially the nuclear power industry, make decisions on how to affect public
opinion and convince the public that its technologies are safe (or whether industry sees
this step as a necessity at all.) This is becoming more important to the nuclear industry as
the U.S. is again looking at nuclear power as a sustainable energy source. In a
democratic society, the public must be considered when making these decisions, because
if the public does not support them, there are many ways for actions to be blocked.
1.1 History
Risk perception studies can be seen as an application of the judgmental heuristics
work of psychologists Tversky and Kahneman [1]. Tversky and Kahneman argued that
people do not make intuitive judgments of probabilities by means of probability calculus
but are influenced by seemingly irrelevant factors and whatever evidence is available to
them [2]. The authors concluded that the social and political problems of the acceptability
of technologies such as nuclear power were related to "small probability/large
consequence"[l], and that the problem was that the public didn't understand how small
the probabilities were and should be educated on the subject [1].
Subsequently, a series of studies began looking at risk-benefit analyses of
different technologies, asking whether the technology is acceptably safe, and how safe is
safe enough? Fischoff et al. [3] suggest that there are two ways to answer the question:
the revealed preference model proposed by Starr [4] and the expressed preferences model
developed by Fischoff et al. [3]. In his revealed preference model, Starr suggests that the
most important contributing factors to risk acceptability are utility and voluntariness [4].
Utility is the level of usefulness of a technology or action, while voluntariness is defined
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as the freedom (or lack of freedom) an individual has to choose whether to be exposed to
that risk. Fischoff et al. built on the work of psychologists Tversky and Kahneman and
introduced the expressed preference model (or psychometric approach)[3]. Based on the
use of questionnaires, Fischoff et al.'s study combined the idea of the heuristics work of
Tversky and Kahneman with a broader range of factors than simply utility and
voluntariness as proposed by Starr [1].
More recently, Siegrist, Keller, and Cousin have developed another approach to
risk perception analysis called the Implicit Attitude Test (IAT) [5]. The purpose of the
IAT is to reveal any attitudes people may have toward a specific technology that are not
revealed through explicit measures such as questionnaires. Studies of this kind are
generating new insights into the subconscious thought processes that go into a perception
of risk.
1.2 Importance of Risk Perception Work to Nuclear Power
Risk perception has been shown to be an important factor in public reactions to
hazards and hazardous technology, especially where nuclear power is concerned. The
public's perception of risk from nuclear technologies has been studied extensively, and
research on the topic continues to play an important role today due to the many difficult
policy problems in the nuclear field, such as nuclear waste and proliferation concerns [6].
Policy makers have turned to forms of risk-benefit analysis to weigh the benefits against
the risks [3]. The common idea is that the level of perceived risk is directly related to the
level of perceived benefit of the technology [3]. However, research has shown perceived
risk to be much more important than expected benefits, an example being that people
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have been found unwilling to trade health risks in accepting a risky facility in exchange
for generous donations to their community [1]. Those trying to lower the public's
resistance to a technology, especially those in the nuclear power industry, must
understand the way that the public's ideas on risk are formed. A failure to understand the
public can hinder the progress of any technology.
1.3 Topics for discussion
By analyzing research on the subject of risk perception and nuclear power, it is
evident that several topics come up with great frequency in the discussion. The topics of
trust, stigma, the difference between experts and laypeople, and educating the public are
all essential for understanding the topic of risk perception and will be discussed in depth.
Trust is essential in dealing with the public on matters of risk, as acceptance of
risks is dependent on confidence in risk management. The public must be able to trust
those in positions of power or they will not accept the risks that they perceive. Polls
conducted in the past have shown that government and industry officials responsible for
managing nuclear power are not highly trusted [7]. While this condition has improved
somewhat over the years, it is important to note the similarities between low levels of
trust and low levels of support for nuclear power.
Stigma is often defined as the shame or disgrace associated with something that is
socially unacceptable. The stigma associated with nuclear power is a serious impediment
to its progress. Several reasons that people fear nuclear power will be discussed, but one
of the most important issues is the public reaction to nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl
[9]. Freudenberg & Pastor note that people react much more strongly to man-made risks
and disasters caused by human error or negligence than to natural disasters [8].
Experts often have different views of risk than the public, and getting the two
groups to share the same view is essential for the success of nuclear power. There are
some impediments to this process, however. From the 1970's to the 1990's, our society
has, on average, grown healthier and safer, and spent billions of dollars on safety, and yet
the American public has grown even more concerned with risk [7]. Experts commonly
assert that the public simply does not understand the risks, and the public and political
opposition to nuclear power is based on irrationality and ignorance [10]. However,
Slovic [7] suggests that the public's concerns cannot be dismissed so easily. A former
administrator for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), William Ruckelshaus,
wrote: "To effectively manage risk, we must seek new ways to involve the public in the
decision-making process... They [the public] need to become involved early, and they
need to be informed if their participation is to be meaningful. [11]."
2. Important Studies
Few studies have had as great an impact on the field of risk perception as those
conducted by Fischoff et al. [3] Slovic et al. [12] and Siegrist et al. [5]. Due to the
complicated nature of their results and the importance of their work to others in the field,
their studies will be examined in depth. This examination will lend itself to a better
understanding of factors important to risk assessment, and will lead to recommendations
for the improvement of the study of risk perception as well as the nuclear power industry.
2.1 The Psychometric Approach
Fischoff et al. [3] suggested that there are two ways to answer the question of how
safe is safe enough: the revealed preference method proposed by Starr [4], and the
expressed preference method proposed by Fischoff et al. [3]. The revealed preference
method assumes that society has arrived at an optimum balance between the risks and
benefits of any activity, and that acceptable risk for a new technology is defined as the
level of safety associated with ongoing activities having similar benefit to society [4].
The expressed preference method, on the other hand, uses questionnaires to measure the
public's attitudes toward risks and benefits from a number of activities [3].
The revealed preference method [4] assumed that the measure of risk for
hazardous activities could be calculated by the expectation of fatalities per hour of
exposure to the activity. The benefit from an activity was assumed to be equal to the
average contribution that the activity made to a person's income, or the average amount
of money spent on the activity by an individual person. Given these assumptions, Starr
derived what Fischoff called 'laws of acceptable risk' [3]:
* The acceptability of risk is roughly proportional to the third power of the benefits;
* The public seems willing to accept risks from voluntary activities roughly 1000
times greater than it would tolerate from involuntary activities that provide the
same level of benefit;
* The acceptable level of risk is inversely related to the number of persons exposed
to that risk; and
* The level or risk tolerated for voluntarily accepted hazards is quite similar to the
level of risk from disease.
The revealed preference approach is not without its critics, however. According to
Fischoff et al. [3] "revealed preference assumes that people not only have full
information, but also can use that information optimally, an assumption that seems quite
doubtful in the light of much research on the psychology of decision-making."
The expressed preferences method, or psychometric approach [3], looks at the
issue of risk perception differently. Psychometric questionnaires are used to investigate
issues pertaining to risk-benefit trade-offs. The use of psychometric questionnaires has
been criticized, as some believe that the answers to hypothetical questions may not be
representative of actual behavior, but Fischoff et al. believe that these criticisms appear to
be overstated.
Fischoff et al. conducted a study [3] to test the usefulness of the questionnaire
technique in examining risk perception. Each participant evaluated 30 different activities
and technologies ranging from alcohol, skiing, and motorcycles to commercial aviation,
pesticides and nuclear power with regard to either its perceived benefit to society or its
perceived risk. Participants were not asked to evaluate both the perceived benefit and the
perceived risk of an activity or a technology. Instead, one group was asked to evaluate the
perceived benefit of the activity, while another group evaluated its perceived risk. This
was done in order to separate the results and avoid having the weight of one contaminate
the other. Each participant was also asked to evaluate the acceptability of its current level
of risk, and its position on each of nine dimensions of risk [3]. When preparing to
perform the study, the instructions read:
This is a difficult, if not impossible task. Nevertheless it is not unlike the
task you face when you vote on legislation pertaining to nuclear power,
handguns or highway safety. One never has all the relevant information;
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ambiguities and uncertainties abound, yet some judgment must be made.
The present task should be approached in the same spirit [3]
When examining the perceived benefit of a particular activity or technology,
participants were instructed to consider all types of benefits: "how much money is
generated directly or indirectly, how much of a contribution is made to the people's
health and welfare, and so on". Participants were also told not to consider risks when
considering the benefits. Those participants tasked with considering perceived risk were
instructed to consider the risk of dying as a consequence of the activity or technology, as
a function of total risk per year, not risk per hour of exposure.
All participants were asked to judge the acceptability of the level of risk currently
associated with each item to determine the risk adjustment factor. Their instructions
read: "The acceptable level is a level which is good enough, where good enough means
you think that the advantages of increased safety are not worth the costs of reducing risk
by restricting or otherwise altering the activity". Finally, the participants were asked to
rate each activity or technology according to nine dimensions that were thought to
influence perceptions of risk. The dimensions included voluntariness of risk, immediacy
of effect, knowledge about risk (by those exposed), knowledge about risk (by scientists),
control over risk, newness, chronic-catastrophic, common-dread, and severity of
consequences.
Participants were members of the Eugene, Oregon League of Women Voters and
their spouses, accounting for 76 individuals, 52 women and 24 men. This set of
participants was chosen as the opinions of the League members were likely to be similar
to the private citizens most heavily engaged in the public policy-making process.
The results from the perceived risk and benefit analysis showed a great difference
between evaluations of non-nuclear and nuclear electric power. In general it was
observed that perceived risk only declined slightly with overall benefit. The authors were
able to conclude from the results that society tolerates a number of activities that were
rated as having very low benefit and very high risk such as handguns, motorcycles,
smoking, and alcoholic beverages as well as activities with great benefit and relatively
low risk such as prescription antibiotics, railroads, and vaccinations. However, society
does not appear to accept the possibility of high casualty events, even with extremely low
risk.
The risk adjustment factor results do not lend themselves to much discussion,
except that there were few items that people believed should be made much safer,
including alcoholic beverages, handguns, motorcycles and nuclear power [3].
Results from rating activities and technologies with respect to the nine dimensions
found that perceived risk correlated with dread and severity but not with any of the other
characteristics. Fischoff et al. applied factor analysis between the dimensions that were
highly inter-correlated, and came up with two factors: Factor 1 - technological risk, and
Factor 2 - severity. Figure 1 plots the 30 activities and technologies on a graph
consisting of Factor 1 as the y-axis and Factor 2 as the x-axis [3].
The high end of Factor 1 was associated with new, involuntary, highly
technological items, which have delayed consequences for masses of people. The low
end of Factor 1 was familiar, voluntary activities with immediate consequences at the
individual level. The high end of Factor 2 was associated with events whose
consequences are certain to be fatal (often for large numbers of people). An important
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item to note on Figure 1 is the isolation of nuclear power, which is plotted high on the
technological risk scale and the severity scale. Fischoff et al. [3] investigated this further
by comparing the ratings of nuclear power on the nine dimensions of risk to the ratings
for x-rays and non-nuclear electric power. The results are plotted in Figure 2.
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The results shown in Figure 2 explore the difference in public perception to nuclear
power as compared to X-rays and electric (non-nuclear) power. Even in comparison with
X-rays, another nuclear technology, nuclear power is seen as having more dread, being
more catastrophic, and being more involuntary and less controllable than x-rays and
electric power. This speaks to the issue at hand, understanding why the public views
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nuclear power as having greater risk than other forms of nuclear technology and other
forms of power production.
Through the results of the psychometric study [3], it was determined that current
risk levels were viewed as unacceptably high. Participants wanted the risks from
different activities to be considerably more equal, and wanted the most risky item on the
list of 30 activities to be only 10 times as risky as the safest. Fischoff et al. also found a
consistent, although not overwhelming relationship between perceived benefit and
acceptable level of risk, with the relationship being characterized by an inverse
relationship between perceived risks and benefits. It was also concluded that society
tolerates higher risk levels for voluntary, than for involuntary activities, and that
expressed preferences indicate that determining acceptable levels of risk may require
consideration of characteristics other than just benefits.
2.2 Extended Psychometric Study
Slovic et al. conducted an extended study [12] of risk perception a few years after
Fischoff et al.'s first psychometric study. This new study kept the basic principles of the
original study but used a broader set of hazards, 90 instead of 30, and 18 risk
characteristics instead of 9. The hazards were selected to show a wider range of
activities, substances and technologies, and the subject pool was taken from college
students. All of the hazards were rated on a 0-100 scale for both risk (from not risky to
extremely risky) and benefit (from no benefit to very great benefit), and then the
respondents were asked to rate the degree to which the risk would have to be adjusted to
make the risk acceptable to society. As in the study by Fischoff et al. [3], one group
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evaluated the perceived risk and the other evaluated perceived benefit to prevent the
weight of one contaminating the other. The 18 risk characteristics included 8 from the
previous psychometric study, and all hazards were rated according to each characteristic
to determine the extent to which the characteristics described the hazard.
As the analysis of the results in Slovic et al.'s study was more extensive and
covered more risks, some time will be devoted to the results, though the study is very
similar to Fischoff et al.'s. Slovic et al. found that respondents judged risks from most
hazards to be at least moderately well known to science, and they furthermore believed
that most of these risks were better known to science than to those who were exposed.
The only risks that the respondents believed were better known to those affected than to
the scientists were risks from police work, marijuana, contraceptives, boxing, skiing,
hunting and other sporting events. The respondents were also asked to judge whether
they thought the risks were decreasing in riskiness, increasing in riskiness, or staying the
same. Of the 90 hazards, only 25 were judged to be decreasing, and 62 hazards were
judged to be increasing. Nuclear power, crime, warfare, and nuclear weapons were
judged to be increasing the most. One of the most striking results is that of the hazards
judged to be increasing the most, none of them were judged to be easily reducible.
As in the first study, the ratings of the risk characteristics were found to be highly
inter-correlated. Slovic et al. followed a similar factor analysis as Fischoff et al. to group
highly correlated characteristics into three factors. Factor 1, called "dread" was made up
of 12 characteristics whose severity was believed to be uncontrollable and be seen as
dread, catastrophic, hard to prevent, fatal, inequitable, threatening to future generations,
not easily reduced, increasing, involuntary and threatening to the rater personally. Factor
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2, called "familiarity" was made up of 5 characteristics dealing with how well the hazard
was known, and consisted of observability, knowledge, immediacy of consequences and
familiarity. Slovic et al. also isolated a single characteristic, the number of people
exposed, and called it Factor 3. Similar to Fischoff et al., Slovic et al. plotted all of the
hazards on a graph of Factor 1, "Dread" on the x-axis and Factor 2, "Familiarity" on the
y-axis. Their results are shown in Figure 3.
Important to note in Figure 3 is the fact that just as in the previous study, nuclear
power is isolated on the high end of both Factor 1 and Factor 2, showing both high dread
and low familiarity.
From the results of the ratings of risks and benefits, Slovic et al. were able to
conclude that respondents do not believe society has worked to limit risks from less
beneficial activities. The authors also noticed that the greater the perceived risk, the
larger the adjustment judged necessary to bring the risk to an acceptable level, while the
more beneficial items were thought to need less risk adjustment. Table 1 shows an
excerpt from Slovic et al.'s results of risk and benefit ratings.
Table 1 shows the perceived risk assigned to each hazard on a scale from 0-100,
with 100 being the riskiest. It also shows perceived benefit, also on a scale from 0-100
with 100 being the most beneficial, and adjusted risk is shown, which is the amount by
which the risk would have to be reduced in order to be accepted by society. From this
excerpt, it can be seen that the level of adjusted risk for nuclear power is on par with
handguns, warfare, crime, terrorism and nerve gas, with similar levels of perceived risk.
This supports the conclusion that nuclear power is greatly feared and could benefit from a
better understanding of its risks by the public.
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Table 1 - Risks and Benefits Ratings
Perceived risk Perceived benefit Adjusted risk
1 Nuclear weapons 78 27 49.1
2 Warfare 78 31 26.2
3 DDT 76 26 8.8
4 Handguns 76 27 15.2
5 Crime 73 9 19.2
6 Nuclear power 72 36 22.2
7 Pesticides 71 38 4.2
8 Herbicides 69 33 6.3
9 Smoking 68 24 6.6
10 Terrorism 66 6 26.3
11 Heroin 63 17 7.6
12 National defense 61 58 4.7
13 Nerve gas 60 7 17.4
14 Barbiturates 57 27 4.8
15 Alcoholic beverages 57 49 2.9
16 Chemical fertilizers 55 48 2.8
17 Motor vehicles 55 76 3.1
18 Amphetamines 55 27 4.9
19 Open-heart surgery 53 50 2.1
20 Morphine 53 31 4.4
21 Radiation therapy 53 36 3.6
22 Darvon 52 38 3.9
23 Oral contraceptives 51 67 3.8
24 Asbestos 51 51 4.9
25 Liquid natural gas 50 56 1.5
26 Chemical 49 47 2.2
disinfectants
27 Valium 48 37 2.6
28 Surgery 48 64 2.4
From their results, Slovic et al. suggest that accepted views of the importance of
voluntary nature of risk and the impact of catastrophic losses of life might need revision.
In their first psychometric study, Fischoff et al. [3] introduced the idea of a
"Voluntariness Hypothesis" that stated "respondents believed that greater risk should be
tolerated for more beneficial activities, and a double standard is appropriate for voluntary
and involuntary activities." The results of the extended psychometric study clarified their
conclusions. Six of the ten hazards rated the most involuntary were also among the ten
most catastrophic hazards, suggesting that other factors may be the cause of the aversion
to involuntary risks [12].
Slovic et al. introduced an example of the voluntariness hypothesis by discussing
the differences in safety associated with a car driven for pleasure by a subject, versus a
chauffeured car for business travel where the subject is merely a passenger. In this
example, the chauffeured car represents an involuntary risk, in that the subject is not the
one controlling the car and its use is required for work, while the car driven by the subject
is offered as an example of a voluntary risk due to its controllability and use for pleasure.
The authors claimed that the subject would want the same level of safety in both
automobiles; regardless of who is driving the car, or for what purpose it is being used.
They went on to claim that society's apparent aversion to involuntary risks might be an
illusion due to the characteristics involuntary risks share with potentially catastrophic
hazards.
This calls to question exactly how much weight the potential for catastrophic
consequences holds with the public's perception of risk. Slovic et al. argue that too much
emphasis is placed on the public's aversion to involuntary risk, and that not enough
emphasis is focused on how catastrophic potential determines societal responses to
hazards. One of the most obvious fears of catastrophic potential is that from nuclear
power. In both of the psychometric studies, respondents believed that nuclear power
posed greater risk of death than any of the other hazards under consideration. Further
research conducted by Slovic et al. has linked this perception to the perceived potential
for disaster. This is supported by the fact that while X-rays utilize the same nuclear
technology as nuclear power, the public does not perceive X-rays as having the same
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potential for catastrophic consequences. From this information, Slovic et al. concluded
that beliefs about the catastrophic potential of nuclear power are the major determinant of
public opposition to the technology.
Slovic and his colleagues noted that demonstrating the improbability of
catastrophic accidents requires large amounts of data, and that without definitive
evidence, weaker data tend to be interpreted according to the individual's prior beliefs.
They also claimed that the differences between pro-nuclear experts and the anti-nuclear
public are not likely to be resolved, "leaving frustration, distrust, conflict and costly
hazard management as its legacy". They foresaw the potential for similar disputes
between experts and the lay public in the area of other low-probability, high-consequence
hazards such as liquefied natural gas, pesticides, industrial chemicals and recombinant-
DNA research.
Another aspect that has been examined by Slovic et al. on the issue of catastrophe
is the public's reaction to catastrophic loss of life. Society reacts more strongly to large,
infrequent losses of life than to small, frequent losses. This has led to the proposal of a
weighting factor that takes into account the greater impact of N lives lost at one time
relative to the impact of one life lost in each of N separate incidents [12]. Wilson [13]
suggests that N lives lost at once are N squared times more important than the loss of a
single life, while Ferreira and Slesin [14] suggest that it may be closer to a function of N
cubed. Slovic et al. [12], on the other hand, suggest that a single weighting function
oversimplifies the effect of catastrophes on the public and "cannot adequately explain,
predict or guide social response to catastrophe."
2.3 Implicit Association Test
The psychometric approach to risk perception is not the only way to look at the
issues. A more recent approach by Siegrist, Keller and Cousin [5] puts more emphasis on
affect as an important factor in risk perception. They have devised a new method to
assess implicit attitudes to examine the affect-related component of risk perception.
The affect heuristic is the idea of combining affect and risk perception, and its
framework distinguishes two different modes of thinking, the experiential system and the
analytical system. The analytic system relies on probabilities, logical reasoning and hard
evidence, while the experiential system relies on images, metaphors and narratives. It is
Siegrist et al.'s claim that lay people use the experiential system and not the analytic
system when asked to evaluate a set of hazards. They claim that implicit measurements
may provide insight for a better understanding of lay people's risk perception.
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) developed by Siegrist et al. measures implicit
attitudes by assessing the response latencies (the delay in responses to the stimulus) of
evaluations in order to overcome the problems associated with asking people directly
about their attitudes toward an object. According to the authors, one problem with the
psychometric approach is that respondents may not be willing to honestly answer
questions posed to them. The benefit to the IAT, on the other hand, is that it indirectly
measures strengths of associations between concepts and evaluative attributes, and may
measure attitudinal differences not captured by more explicit methods such as
questionnaires. This is accomplished by requiring the participants to respond very
quickly, which leads to experiential processing [5].
One part of the IAT study examined the implicit attitudes toward nuclear power,
based on the assumption that nuclear power is perceived as a dreadful hazard.
Participants' implicit reactions to nuclear power were compared to their implicit reactions
to hydroelectric power. Siegrist et al. hypothesized that "even those who are indifferent
to or in favor of nuclear power do not associate positive affect with the technology".
They discovered that for most participants, nuclear power was more closely related to
negative concepts than was hydroelectric power. In addition, the expected relationship
between explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes toward nuclear power was observed:
those who had positive explicit attitudes towards nuclear power showed lower IAT
effects than those who had negative explicit attitudes toward nuclear power.
Siegrist et al. concluded that people who are indifferent to the building of new
nuclear power plants have negative implicit attitudes toward nuclear power, or very
positive implicit attitudes toward hydroelectric power. They argued that negative or
neutral implicit attitudes toward nuclear power might pose a problem for the long-term
acceptance of the technology, and warned that people would quickly change their views
should another accident in a nuclear power plant occur.
3. Important Themes relevant to Nuclear Power and Risk Perception
Looking at the previous studies by Starr [4], Fischoff et al. [3], Slovic et al. [12],
and Siegrist et al. [5], revealed a number of important themes including trust, the stigma
associated with nuclear power, and the difference between the experts and the public, as
identified and defined in section 1.3. Each of these themes warrants greater discussion.
3.1 Trust
Trust is such a familiar concept that it is not often explored as a factor in risk
management. Society has a tendency to trust technologies in the medical field, while
remaining wary of those in an industrial setting, even if they rely on the same technology.
For instance, medical technologies based on radiation and chemicals are seen as high in
benefit and low in risk, while industrial technologies based on radiation and chemicals
are seen as low in benefit and high in risk. The field of risk assessment has developed to
assist in the management of technological hazards, and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) have made risk
assessment the center of their regulatory efforts. However, studies have shown that the
public perceptions are not necessarily influenced by technical risk assessment. Slovic [7]
argues that the solution lies in a new field, the field of risk communication, whose role is
to bring experts and laypeople into alignment and make conflicts easier to resolve. Trust
is fundamental to conflict resolution. It is also the most important factor to the success of
risk communication, for without trust, the risk communication will not work.
One of the fundamental characteristics of trust is that it is created slowly but can
be destroyed in an instant by a single mistake. In his article entitled "Risk, Trust, and
Democracy," Slovic quoted Lincoln as saying "If you once forfeit the confidence of your
fellow citizens, you can never regain their respect and esteem" [7]. Rothbart and Park
conducted a survey supporting this idea [15]. Respondents rated 150 traits in terms of the
number of instances required to establish or disconfirm the trait. Favorable traits were
judged to be hard to acquire and easy to lose, while unfavorable traits were judged to be
easier to acquire and harder to lose.
Slovic et al. [12] argued that the occurrence of a rare, catastrophic event contains
information regarding the probability of its recurrence, an effect he deemed the event's
signal value. They claim that the number of people killed appeared to be unimportant in
determining the signal value of an event.
Slovic [7] has also proposed the so-called asymmetry principle, claiming that
mechanisms of human psychology make it easier to destroy trust than to create it. He
suggests that negative events are more visible or noticeable than positive events, and that
negative events carry more weight than positive events. In a study by Slovic, Flynn
Johnson & Mertz [16], 103 college students were asked to rate the impact of 45
hypothetical news events pertaining to a large nuclear power plant nearby. They were
instructed to indicate whether their trust in the management of the plant would be
increased or decreased, and how strongly it would be increased or decreased on a scale
from 1 to 7. Slovic plotted the percentages of category 7 ratings (very powerful impact
on trust) for each of the news events. His results are shown in Figure 4.
It is interesting to note that while "Record keeping is good" could account for
only a negligible increase in trust, "poor record keeping" would decrease trust by 18%
and "records were falsified" had the greatest percentage of impact for decreasing trust.
The only event that had any substantial impact on increasing trust stated, "an advisory
board of local citizens and environmentalists is established to monitor the plant and is
given legal authority to shut the plant down if they believe it to be unsafe" [16].
Slovic [7] argued that sources of bad news are also seen as more credible than
sources of good news. He chose as an example the fact that positive '(bad news)'
evidence from animal bioassays is assumed to show evidence of a risk to humans,
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whereas negative evidence that the chemical was not found to be harmful, carries little
weight in proving its safety.
Another aspect of dealing with trust is that once any distrust is initiated, it tends to
reinforce and perpetuate distrust. Distrust prevents the formation of personal contacts
and experiences needed to overcome that distrust. Any initial trust or distrust will cloud
the interpretation of new events, and will only serve to reinforce the prior belief. For
example, those who supported nuclear power saw the accident at Three Mile Island as
proof that the system worked, noting that the multiple-safety systems shut down the plant
and contained most of its radiation. Those who distrusted nuclear power to begin with
perceived that those in charge didn't know what was wrong or how to fix it, and it was
only luck that prevented a major catastrophe [7].
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Figure 4: Impact of Events on Increasing and Decreasing Trust
3.2 Stigma
Stigma is most often associated with concerns society has about health risks of
technologies, including nuclear power, hazardous waste storage, genetic engineering, and
electromagnetic fields [17] and is most often brought about by some critical event,
accident or report of a hazardous condition [18]. Stigmatization represents an
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increasingly significant factor, which influences development of risk management
policies as well as the general acceptance of technologies [17]. In the 1950s, nuclear
energy was said to be clean, cheap, and safe, but is now subject to stigmatization [18].
This reflects the public's perception of abnormally great risk and their distrust of
management.
There are many aspects of nuclear power that have been stigmatized, but one of
the most notable is the debate on nuclear waste. Slovic et al. [10] argue that the lack of a
suitable solution to the problem of nuclear waste is an obstacle to the development of
nuclear power, and threatens the operation of existing reactors, as well as being a safety
hazard. The question of stigma has been studied with relation to the proposed nuclear
waste repository in Yucca Mountain, Nevada and some have argued that Nevada will lose
some of its attractiveness to tourists with the presence of the repository. It is their
argument that places, technologies and products become stigmatized and as a result suffer
economic losses due to the negative characterization [17]. It is for this precise reason that
in 1992, the supreme court of New Mexico upheld an award of $337, 815 to a couple for
diminished property value due to the proximity of their land to a proposed transportation
route for transuranic wastes [18].
The stigmatization of nuclear waste is greatly unfounded, according to some.
Lewis [19] argued, "The risk from a properly constructed repository is as negligible as it
is possible to imagine... It is embarrassingly easy to solve the technical problems, yet
impossible to solve the political problems... High-level nuclear waste disposal is a non-
risk". Yet the stigma surrounding nuclear power and nuclear waste remains.
In a study conducted by Slovic, Flynn, & Layman [10], 2500 respondents were
questioned by telephone about their perceptions of the risks and benefits associated with
a nuclear waste repository, their support of or opposition to the Department of Energy
(DOE) repository program, their trust in the ability of the DOE to manage the program,
and their views on a variety of other issues pertaining to radioactive waste disposal. The
average distance that the respondents were willing to live from a nuclear waste facility
was 200 miles, which is twice the distance they were willing to live from a chemical
waste landfill. To further investigate these feelings surrounding nuclear waste, Slovic,
Flynn & Layman conducted another study [10] in which 3334 respondents were asked to
freely associate about the concept of a nuclear waste repository. Their responses were
assigned to 13 general categories, the largest of which were "negative consequences" and
"negative concepts". Of note is the extreme negative quality of the images, where a
general category labeled "positive" only accounted for 1% of the images. Also of note is
that when responding to a prompt of nuclear waste repositories, there were no positive
associations to energy and other benefits of nuclear power. This led Slovic, Flynn &
Layman to the conclusion that the images people had towards a nuclear waste repository
showed an aversion so strong that "to label it dislike hardly does it justice."
Nuclear fears are deeply rooted in our social and cultural consciousness, centered
around the use of "uncanny rays that brought hideous death or miraculous new life" [10].
The general fear of nuclear technology may stem from the destructive power of nuclear
weapons witnessed in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; in fact Fiske, Pratto and
Pavelchak [20] found that people's images of nuclear war were similar to the images they
obtained for nuclear waste repositories. Even before the accidents at Three Mile Island
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and Chernobyl, people expected nuclear accidents at nuclear power plants to lead to
disasters of immense proportions. People asked to describe the consequences of a typical
reactor accident came up with ideas like the aftermath of nuclear war [21]. This shared
imagery of nuclear weapons, nuclear power and nuclear waste may explain why the idea
of a nuclear waste repository is so feared by the public.
Another aspect of stigma surrounding nuclear technologies is the idea of
"tampering with nature." There is a basic assumption that what is natural is safe and
healthy, and what is artificial or manmade is the opposite. A dimension of the
"tampering with nature" variable may include a moral component, and there is a well
known link between morality and risk as well as risk acceptability. Sjoberg [6] suggests
that the main fear from nuclear technology is connected with the specific fear of radiation
and cancer.
Despite the stigma surrounding nuclear power, there is still hope, as recent studies
indicate that those living closest to nuclear power plants approve of them. A study
conducted by Morrison, Simpson-Housley & De Man [22] focused on how people living
near a nuclear plant cope with the threat of nuclear emergency at the plant. They
discovered that certain traits that individuals use to defend themselves against threats
could be used to place them on what they termed "the repression-sensitization
continuum." At one end of the spectrum are the repressors who use defense mechanisms
such as avoidance, denial, rationalization, and repression to avoid anxiety-producing
circumstances. Morrison et al. [22] claim that repressors deal with threat by minimizing
or denying its existence, and do not express their feelings about the danger or
contemplate its consequences. On the other end of the spectrum, sensitizers use
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intellectualization, obsessive thinking and ruminative worrying when confronted with a
threat. They freely communicate their feelings of anxiety and attempt to achieve control
over the danger by over-contemplating its possible consequences.
Their study was conducted in the town of Pickering, Ontario, Canada and
consisted of 66 men and 93 women selected at random within a radius of 5 kilometers
from the nearby Pickering Nuclear Generating Station. The study consisted of a five-
question survey to ascertain their feelings about the nuclear power plant. Ninety-One
percent of those responding reported no family history of employment at the nuclear
plant. The results of the study showed a much higher density of repressors in the area,
which was explained by the fact that that the plant had been in existence for more than
three decades and that repressors would be more likely to live near a nuclear power plant.
The results also showed that repressors, neutrals and sensitizers in the area all reported
low levels of worry about nuclear accidents and the probability of disaster happening, as
well as elevated levels of confidence in the utility company in charge of the station. It is
important to note that repressors and sensitizers shared a lack of confidence in the
government's ability to cope with nuclear disaster.
3.3 Experts and the Public
In his article, "Risk Perception: Experts and the Public," Lennart Sjoberg [1]
claims that the reason risk perception is a cause of social conflicts is because different
groups perceive risks in different ways. He claims that experts and the public differ in
their perceptions of risk according to three basic cases. In Case 1, cases involving well-
known and common risks, the public makes basically correct risk judgments, and there is
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agreement between experts and the public. In Case 2, experts are concerned, but the
public is less worried, as in the case of radon in homes. Finally, In Case 3, risks are
judged by experts as being very small, while the public feels that the risks are very large.
Figures 5 and 6 show the extent to which Case 3 applies to nuclear power, and the
difference in perceptions between experts and the public. Figure 5 shows the responses
to the question of whether there is a satisfactory solution to the nuclear waste problem.
Figure 6 shows the attitude of the respondents toward nuclear power in general.
Sjoberg [1] suggests several explanations for the observed disparity: 1) The public
may be misinformed and the experts may be making realistic risk assessments 2) They
may have different definitions of risk, where experts pay more attention to probability
and the public pays more attention to consequences 3) Experts directly involved in an
area may perceive that they have control over its risks 4) There may be a general political
ideology that causes each group to perceive risk in their own way and/or 5) The public
may be more sensitive to risks, and may tend to make higher risk ratings, as they are the
ones that will be affected.
Experts also differ in their development and understanding of trust. Experts
develop their trust in technology before they have any experience in the field. This points
to a difference between experts and the public, before the 'experts' have received their
professional training. Experts also often assume trust in social and psychological
circumstances; as an example, it is the contention of the expert community that a nuclear
waste repository would not create stigma on the community [1].
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Figure 5: Is There a Satisfactory Solution to the Nuclear Waste Problem?
Sjoberg [1] conducted several studies to examine the difference between experts
and the public, especially where nuclear waste is concerned. In his studies, he included a
group of graduate engineers from non-nuclear fields, and found that they gave risk
judgments midway between nuclear experts and the public concerning the risks from
nuclear waste. He concluded that the level of education could not fully explain the
difference in perceptions of experts and the public.
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Figure 6: Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power
In another study, experts on nuclear waste disposal and members of the general
public were asked to rate a large number of risks. The average ratings are shown in
Figure 7. Of interest in Sjoberg's results is that the nuclear waste experts rated risks
similarly to the general public, except for risks in their own field of work. They even
agreed with the public on the risk from radon, a radiation risk that is not associated with
nuclear technology. From these results, Sjoberg concluded that perceived control and
familiarity account for the low risk ratings the experts assigned risks in their own field
This supports the importance of attitude to the risk-generating agent as a factor of risk
perception. As can be seen from Figure 6, experts in the nuclear field have a very pro-
nuclear attitude.
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Figure 7: Mean Risk Ratings by Nuclear Waste Experts and the Public
Another approach to understanding risk perception and the need for mitigation
(adjustment of the risk to be acceptable by the public) is to include trivial, everyday risks
in a study with fatal and very serious risks. It was found that the trivial risks, such as
getting a cold or not having your newspaper delivered on time, were judged to be just as
large or larger than the fatal risks. Sjoberg [1] argues that this shows two fundamental
things about risk: 1) risk is mostly related to probability, and 2) the demand for risk
mitigation is related to the severity of the consequences.
It is important to understand the implication that these results have for the
understanding of public risk perception. Groups that are different in regard to education,
interest, and employment differ greatly in how they perceive risk. So far, there have been
no suitable explanations for the differences. The idea that it depends solely on the level
of knowledge or education fails to account for the whole picture. It is essential that
36
· ·i·-
f .....f __.___...I.~ ll-.x~ ....~ .................
~"~"'- ~I""`~"~~"""""""~""`~""`-~
n rr
experts understand the differences between their perception of risk and the public's in
order to set up a dialog rather than one-way communication from the experts to the
public.
3.4 Educating the Public
On his return to the EPA for a second term as administrator, William Ruckelshaus
called for a government-wide process for managing risks that thoroughly involved the
public. In an article he wrote for Science he argued:
To effectively manage ... risk, we must seek new ways to involve the
public in the decision-making process... They [the public] need to become
involved early, and they need to be informed if their participation is to be
meaningful [11]
He also argued that the government must accommodate the will of the people, by quoting
Thomas Jefferson's famous dictum: "If we think [the people] not enlightened enough to
exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion" [23]. This proved more difficult than Ruckelshaus
had expected. Informing the public about risk issues is surprisingly difficult to
accomplish. The challenge is to find ways of presenting complex technical material that
is clouded by uncertainty and is inherently difficult to understand in a way that the public
can easily understand.
There are definite limits of risk assessment according to Slovic [23]. He argues
that risk assessments are constructed from theoretical models based on assumptions and
subjective judgments, and if these assumptions are deficient, the resulting assessments
may be inaccurate as well. The problems with risk assessment are most evident in the
assessment of chronic health effects due to low-level exposure to toxic chemicals and
radiation. There are also problems in the way that engineers estimate probability and
severity of accidents in complex systems such as nuclear reactors. Most often, risk
estimates are devised from theoretical models such as fault trees or event trees used to
depict all possible accidents and their probabilities. However, any limitation in the
quality of the analysis, the quality of the judged risks, or improper rules for combining
estimates can compromise the assessment.
Similar to the limits of risk assessment, Slovic [23] introduces three major
limitations of public understanding: 1) People's perceptions of risk are often inaccurate,
2) Risk information may frighten and frustrate the public, and 3) Strong beliefs are hard
to modify, while naYve views are easily manipulated.
People's perceptions of risk are influenced by the memorability of past events,
and as such, anything that makes a hazard unusually memorable or imaginable will
distort their perception of risk. Risks from dramatic causes such as homicide, cancer, and
natural disasters tend to be overestimated, while risks from un-dramatic causes such as
asthma, diabetes and emphysema tend to be underestimated. This may be due to the fact
that the un-dramatic causes of risk take one life at a time and are common in non-fatal
form. The effect of this weighting of risks is magnified by the fact that media coverage
of hazards is biased in much the same direction [23].
The inaccurate perceptions of risk by the public suggests the need for educational
programs, however, mentioning possible adverse consequences of an activity or
technology to the public might make it seem more likely to happen, regardless of the
probability associated with the event. A study by Morgan et al. [24] provides evidence of
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this. In the study, people's judgments of the risks from high voltage power lines were
assessed, and then reassessed after they had read a neutral description of findings from
studies of possible health effects due to such lines. The results found by Morgan et al.
showed a definite shift toward greater concern. It appears that the mention of potential
risks raises concerns, but the use of worst-case scenarios creates extremely negative
reactions in people because they have difficulty appreciating the improbability of the
event, but can easily imagine the consequences [24]. People attempt to reduce their
anxiety about the uncertainty of an event happening by imagining that the risk is so small
that it can be ignored, or by imagining that it is so large that it should be avoided. The
public generally rebels against being told probabilities instead of facts. Ideally, people
would prefer to know that the risks are being managed by competent personnel, and that
they don't have to worry about the risks, but if they can't get these assurances, they
would want to be fully informed [23].
Another important limitation of public understanding deals with people's beliefs.
People's beliefs change very slowly and are persistent even when confronted with
contrary evidence [25]. When new evidence is presented, people only find it reliable and
informative if it is in line with their previous beliefs, and evidence that is contrary to their
beliefs is dismissed as unreliable, erroneous or unrepresentative [23]. On the other hand,
when people lack a strong opinion initially, they are easily swayed by the way that the
information is presented. By representing risks in terms of how many people died instead
of how many lived in a form of treatment for lung cancer, McNeil et al. [26] observed a
drop from 44% of respondents approving of the treatment to 18%. This shows that those
responsible for information programs can manipulate perceptions and behavior based on
their method of presentation.
The news media has an important role in informing people about risk. Critics of
the media note that there is a great deal of misinformation dealing with hazards such as
recombinant DNA research, nuclear power, and cancer. Some blame the media for the
public's apparent overreaction to risk [23]. Bernard Cohen argued:
Journalists have grossly misinformed the American public about the
dangers of radiation and of nuclear power with their highly unbalanced
treatments and their incorrect or misleading interpretations of scientific
information... This misinformation is costing our nation thousands of
unnecessary deaths and wasting billions of dollars each year. [27]
However, some argue that it is not entirely the journalists' fault. Slovic [23] argues that
journalists lack the scientific background necessary to sort through the complex
information that they gather. He argues that because of the technical complexity of the
subject matter, journalists must depend on expert sources. But even this is not infallible,
as the journalists may not be able to identify which experts they need to interview.
There are two directions for further research Slovic suggests that require
additional focus: informed consent, and risk and the media [23]. Most of the efforts to
communicate risks are based on the rights of the public to be informed about hazards to
which they are exposed. Research is needed to find out what people know and what they
want to know about risk, and to determine the best way to communicate that risk to them.
Ideas that at first appear to be useful often turn out to make the problem worse. One
example is discussed by Slovic [23], "an attempt to convey the smallness of 1 part of
toxic substance per billion by drawing an analogy to a crouton in a 5 ton salad seems
likely to enhance one's misperception of the contamination by making it more easily
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imaginable". Testing the message can provide a necessary insight into the impact it will
have on the public. It is also of great importance to discover whether a message will
adequately inform its recipients. According to Slovic, "an informer who puts forth a
message without testing its comprehensibility is guilty of negligence" [23]. It is still a
question of how one can accurately test a message, and how the communicator knows
when a message is good enough. Further research is needed on this front to explore these
aspects of informing the public.
Further research is also needed on the front of risk and the media in order to
improve the media's role in communicating risk. Incidents involving hazards perceived
to have Slovic's characteristics of "unknown", "dread", and "catastrophic potential"
appear to receive greater news coverage than other incidents. It has been hypothesized
that these stories arouse negative affect and influence public perception of the risks
associated with the technologies or hazards [23]. This requires further study in order to
understand exactly how media coverage influences our perceptions of threat.
4. Present Political Status of Nuclear Power
One of the goals of this thesis is to examine how the research that has been done
on risk perception has been applied to nuclear power, if it has been applied at all. In
order to understand the current political status of nuclear power, the roles and opinions of
three important groups dealing with nuclear energy were examined: 1) the NRC, 2) the
nuclear energy production industry, and 3) experts in the field of nuclear power and
environmentalists concerned with the subject. I looked specifically at the impact that
nuclear technologies have on the public, and the efforts being made to understand and
mitigate that impact.
4.1 The Role of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
In a recent speech, the Chairman of the NRC, Dr Richard Meserve [28], discussed
the current state of nuclear power, and where he saw the duties of the NRC going in the
future. Meserve claimed that nuclear power is currently experiencing a "quiet
renaissance" in the United States due to the rising cost of electric power and more
stringent limits on conventional power production due to environmental concerns. He
used the term 'quiet renaissance' to express the fact that though more interest is being
generated about nuclear power, it has been mostly overlooked by the public. However,
the benefits of nuclear power are being brought to the public's attention through
increased efficiency and an ever-improving safety record. Meserve argued that the
economic success of nuclear power is intimately related to the safety and reliability of the
plants:
the data show that strong economic performance goes hand-in-hand with
strong safety performance: attention to safety serves to make plants more
reliable. Safety and economic performance are not merely compatible;
they are mutually reinforcing. It is no accident that the steadily improving
economic performance of nuclear plants over the past decade is
accompanied by remarkable improvements in the safety performance
indicators -- fewer scrams, greater availability of critical equipment, fewer
unplanned shutdowns, and reduced radiation exposure of workers [28].
Meserve sees the role of the NRC in the future to maintain acceptable safety
performance while eliminating what he termed "needless regulatory burden," not needed
to assure public health and safety, to protect the environment, or to safeguard nuclear
materials. He recognizes the importance of public attitudes in the success or failure of
nuclear energy, and argues that it is an obligation of nuclear regulators to understand and
confront public concerns about nuclear technologies. Meserve argued that this does not
mean that it is the NRC's job to promote the use of nuclear power, but that the NRC has a
significant impact on public attitudes and "must be seen as a rigorous, independent and
capable regulator". In fact, it is one of the NRC's major goals to enhance the public
confidence in the abilities of the NRC [28].
In order to increase the public's confidence, Meserve identified the need to
enhance communication and openness. He argued that the most important aspect to
instilling confidence is to provide open process so the public has the opportunity to voice
their concerns and see that they are being listened to. There must be an effort to involve
the stakeholders in the development of the regulatory processes. One way this can be
accomplished is by ensuring that the information is available to the public. It is important
to remember, Meserve cautions, that it is not possible to force everyone to agree, but that
the goal should be to offer the information and show that no concern has been ignored
[28].
Many of these principles advocated by Meserve are in line with the suggestions
put forth by Morgan et al. [24] on educating the public, and Meserve's conclusion shows
definite promise for the future of nuclear power regulation and its understanding of
public perceptions:
I believe that, in order for nuclear power is to play a significant role in
sustainable development, there must be a demonstrated commitment to
safety. To this end, the industry and the NRC both have a responsibility to
ensure safe operations. Moreover, the fulfillment of nuclear technology's
potential is dependent on its acceptance by the public. The NRC's
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responsibility is to ensure that the public has reason to be confident in the
NRC's capabilities as a strong, competent, and fair regulator. Other issues,
such as waste disposal, must also be dealt with promptly and forthrightly.
If these issues can be resolved, the renaissance of nuclear power that
appears on the horizon may be realized [28].
4.2 The Role of the Nuclear Power Industry
In preparing a discussion of the current status of the nuclear power industry, I
interviewed Craig Nesbit, Director of Communications for Exelon Nuclear Operations. I
chose to explore the practices of Exelon Nuclear as it operates the largest nuclear fleet in
the country, providing more than 18,000 megawatts, or 20% of the U.S. nuclear
industry's power capacity [29]. I contacted Mr. Nesbit by phone and was able to get a
general sense of how the nuclear industry, specifically Exelon Nuclear, deals with public
perceptions of nuclear power, and what the future holds for nuclear energy from an
industry standpoint.
Nesbit began the interview by cautioning that the premise that the nuclear power
industry acts as a whole may be incorrect. He suggested that while some companies
practice proactive outreach programs, others do not. He warned against assuming that
Exelon represents the entire nuclear power industry. Nonetheless, an examination of the
practices of one of the largest operators of nuclear power plants does provide insight into
the industry, and offers a glimpse into what is being done by the larger companies at
least.
While Exelon Nuclear has been around for less than 10 years, the nuclear power
industry has a long memory, and the consequences of the accidents at Three Mile Island
and Chernobyl have not been forgotten. Nesbit agrees with Slovic et al.'s discussion of
the signal value of events [12]. It is not always the event itself that affects the public's
perception, but the idea that it may happen again elsewhere. It is this idea that the
nuclear industry must combat, and Nesbit claims that it is not entirely a question of public
relations. Public acceptance has more to do with good operation than public relations. By
operating safely and efficiently, nuclear power plants can prove that they are safe. The
efficiency of nuclear power plants, measured in output and operating time, is very
important to public acceptance, as the technology is seen as worthless if it is safe but
doesn't produce any power. However, even with a long history of safe and efficient
operation, Nesbit admits that perception can change in an instant with one mistake. This
idea is echoed by Siegrist et al. [5], who concluded that people would quickly change
their views about nuclear power should another accident in a nuclear power plant occur.
The only way to combat the risk of an accident at a nuclear power plant is by
emphasizing safety to an extreme level. Safety is ingrained in the minds of workers at
nuclear power plants, and is emphasized and rewarded by management. At Exelon, there
is no penalty for conservative shutdowns. In fact, conservative thinking is stressed
because it is understood that conservative thinking is important in order to prevent any
accidents from occurring. Nesbit claims that the incident at the Davis-Besse plant is an
example of when conservative thought processes were not encouraged, and output was
given priority over safety. The risk in the nuclear power industry is that mistakes have
much greater magnitude, so there is far greater pressure on those managing the plants to
prevent accidents from happening. A mistake at a coal-fired plant may cause damage to
components and may shut down the plant, while a mistake at a nuclear plant could cause
serious damage to the industry as a whole.
This introduces the question of how it is possible to convince people of the safety
of nuclear power. Nesbit claims that the major issue at hand is that people fear what they
don't understand. The more they understand, the less they will fear. He suggests that
getting the public to understand how things operate in a nuclear plant is at the heart of
aligning their ideas of the risks of nuclear power with those of the experts. If they are
able to observe the mentality of those working in nuclear power facilities and gain an
understanding of the training the workers receive, the public may be able to better
appreciate the efforts of the industry, and may begin to show more trust in the managers
of nuclear plants.
Education programs and plant tours may account for the fact that those living in
close proximity to nuclear power plants tend to accept them more, and approve of nuclear
power. Nesbit claims that being around the plants on a daily basis and interacting with
plant employees decreases the unknown dimension of nuclear power. The work done by
Morrison et al. [22] affirms that though there is a stigma surrounding nuclear power
plants, those living nearby do show greater support for the technology.
One aspect of risk communication that Nesbit stressed was that it is essential that
everyone know everything. He argued that each nuclear plant must do an excellent job
of keeping the public informed about every detail of the day-to-day operations of the
plant. If there is ever any instance that could cause alarm, the public must be told
immediately. This goes all the way down to an ambulance coming to the plant. If
someone trips and breaks their leg, and an ambulance is called to take him/her to the
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hospital, people at the plant contact every stakeholder to explain why they will be
hearing an ambulance siren. This constant communication sets up a foundation of trust,
so that people will understand what is going on at the plant, and not fear that they are
being kept out of the loop. If people know that something's going on, but don't know
the specific facts, they will fill in the blanks with their imaginations.
This strategy of communication is very much in line with a degree of openness
and involvement with the public that Slovic [7] claimed is necessary to restore a degree
of trust. I believe that this level of communication is an example of what Slovic [7]
meant by going "beyond public relations and two-way communication to encompass
levels of power-sharing and public participation in decision-making" that hadn't been
seen at the time. Nesbit claims that for a nuclear plant to be successful, the people must
have confidence in the leadership and management of the plant.
When asked about the future of nuclear power, and what pitfalls he foresaw with
a possible increase of nuclear power plants being built in the country, Nesbit replied that
he expected no change in the focus on safety with the addition of more plants, arguing
that the emphasis on safety is too ingrained in the minds of nuclear engineers. However,
he believes that there is a risk of taking public support for granted, assuming that public
support for nuclear power means that their fears have dissipated, and there is no need for
communication. He claims that the danger is that the plant managers will stop dealing
with their neighbors. There is the possibility of repeating the "bunker mentality" seen
after the accident at Three Mile Island, where the public was kept out of the loop, and left
out of the decision-making dealing with the plants, while the industry pretended to keep
them informed by offering school visits and plant visitor's centers rather than
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communicating with them. As more plants begin to appear, the public must remain
informed and in control for nuclear power to continue to be successful.
4.3 Expert Opinions and the Role of Environmentalists
In the current political environment, it is a strange coincidence that experts in the
field of nuclear technologies are actually thinking along the same lines as environmental
activists. Current concerns over global warming and greenhouse gases have caused a
resurgence of interest in nuclear power as a clean energy source. One of the only issues
preventing the widespread acceptance of nuclear power is the question of what to do with
nuclear waste, but this issue is being discussed by experts in the field and
environmentalists alike to determine a solution.
In an interview with Environment & Energy Daily [30], Robert Rosner, the
director of Argonne National Laboratory, made a claim that nuclear energy is
unavoidable at some level in the long run. He argued that it is not possible to contain all
of the carbon dioxide being emitted from the use of fossil fuels if there is not a significant
change. This is not a new argument for experts in the nuclear energy field, but what is
new is Rosner's argument for the reprocessing of spent fuel. Rosner argued for the
implementation of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program put forth by
the Bush administration, which aims at reducing waste through the reprocessing and
recycling of nuclear waste. Once reprocessed, what is left can be characterized as low-
level waste, and alleviates problems with storing it. Rosner argues that the reprocessing
of nuclear waste is essential due to the fact that 2,200 tons of radioactive waste is created
annually in the United States. That means that by the year 2050 the US will have
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produced more than 94,600 tons of nuclear waste in addition to what is currently being
stored at plants across the country, and the proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca
Mountain will only have a capacity of 77,000 tons.
An interesting case to examine in the area of experts and environmentalists is that
of Patrick Moore, one of the founding members of Greenpeace, a decidedly anti-nuclear
environmental group, who recently left Greenpeace to become co-chairman of the Clean
and Safe Energy Coalition (CASEnergy) a group that supports nuclear power [31].
Moore points out that Greenpeace and other environmental groups were founded on the
principle of lumping civilian nuclear energy and nuclear weapons together, but he argues
that principle is a mistake. Even though he was one of the founders of Greenpeace, he
recognizes that a distinction needs to be made between nuclear power and nuclear
weapons. He argues that one of the downsides of environmental groups like Greenpeace
and the Sierra Club is that they do not foster freethinking, or the reevaluation of their
principles. Moore claims that if you are in Greenpeace you are not allowed to support
nuclear power, it is seen as heresy. However, Moore argues that there are many benefits
to nuclear power and discusses some of the public's resistance to it, from the perspective
of a former anti-nuclear activist.
Moore argues that fossil fuels have many other uses such as fertilizers and
plastics, but we are burning through them at a ridiculous rate, while there is only one use
for uranium, and that is for the production of energy. He argues that a reduction of fossil
fuel consumption is necessary, but he does not believe that renewable resources can be
used alone. Eighty-six percent of the country's energy supply currently comes from
fossil fuels, and Moore claims that the only ways to dramatically offset the use of fossil
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fuels is hydroelectric power and nuclear power. While hydroelectric power has the
potential for large amounts of energy, Moore notes that it is already built almost to
capacity in industrialized nations, reducing the choice to between fossil fuels and nuclear
power. Given this choice, Moore argues that support should clearly be given to nuclear
power.
One aspect of public concern that Moore discusses is the fear of proliferation of
nuclear weapons. Moore argues that the public too often associates nuclear power with
nuclear weapons, and that the two technologies are very different. He also argues that an
increase in nuclear power plants would not pose any increased risk of nuclear weapon
proliferation, as nuclear reactors are not necessary to enrich uranium for nuclear
weapons. In fact, Moore argues that it is harder to make a bomb from used nuclear fuel
than it is to enrich uranium with centrifuge technology. He suggests that even if we shut
down all of the nuclear power plants in the world, it would not prevent military use of
nuclear weapons, and that an increase in nuclear power plants would not hurt the
situation.
Another aspect of concern is the issue of nuclear waste, but Moore argues that the
issue is not as pressing as one would believe. Moore claims that nuclear waste is fully
contained, and that it is not going anywhere, the much more important issue is respiratory
problems caused by the burning of fossil fuels. Moore claims that nuclear waste is safely
and securely stored, and that at some point in the future it will be recycled to get at some
of the energy still in the waste. He claims that a feasible recycling program may not
happen for 30 to 50 years, but that engineers are fully capable of keeping the waste safely
stored until then, just as it is being done every day at 103 reactors around the country.
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5. Recommendations for the Future of Nuclear Power
Research into the public's perception of risk and insight into how the nuclear
power industry operates today makes it possible to draw conclusions pertaining to the
nuclear industry's public relations. Recommendations can be drawn from this research
that will aide in the development of nuclear technology and a resurgence of nuclear
power, while addressing the public's concerns and furthering the public's understanding
of nuclear technology. These suggestions are all inter-related, and have been presented in
an attempt to build on the discussion of each into the next.
5.1 Decrease Dread, Increase Familiarity
In Slovic et al.'s study [12] one of the major results was shown visually by
plotting the hazards on a graph as a function of Factor 1 (Dread) and Factor 2
(Familiarity) shown in Figure 3. This figure shows nuclear power isolated from the other
hazards being both high dread and low familiarity. The first recommendation is a general
one that will be built off of in subsequent recommendations, and that is that the position
of nuclear power on the graph of dread and familiarity must be improved. It is necessary
to decrease the dread the public feels toward nuclear power, and to increase their
familiarity with the technologies being utilized. Many cues can be taken from section 3.4
on ways of informing the public about risk, but most important to this suggestion is
understanding the limitations of public understanding. Great care must be taken to avoid
frightening the public or an increased familiarity may have the negative effect of
increasing dread. Coupled with educating the public to increase its familiarity with the
technology, continuing safe operating procedures at existing nuclear power plants will
have a profound impact on lowering the public's perceived dread from the hazard.
5.2 Conducting Studies from an Industry Perspective
To date, the majority of research available on the subject of risk perception has
been done from a psychological point of view. The psychological view is useful in
understanding the way that people think about risk and how their perceptions of risk
affect their decision-making abilities; however, a more focused look at risk pertaining to
the nuclear power industry may be of greater use. The nuclear power industry has not
explored such a dimension, and has thus far relied on outside research to understand how
the public reacts to risk. While some of the studies have looked specifically at nuclear
power, there has been little research done by the nuclear power industry itself. Such an
examination could be useful to the industry as it may offer a perspective specifically
important to the goals of the industry. Research should be conducted directly by the
industry to explore aspects that reflect efforts the industry has made to affect public
opinions, and could be repeated in order to gauge the success or failure of their efforts.
This may aide in a better allocation of resources toward programs that are getting the
message across to the public, and could improve the overall image of nuclear power.
5.3 Work with the Media
The news media can greatly affect public perceptions of how risky a technology
is. Slovic [23] argues that the media has a tendency to misinform the public about
technological risks, and that this may cause the public to overreact to certain risks. In
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order to improve the performance of the media, he argues that the first step is to
acknowledge the potential the media has for informing the public about risk, and commit
to improve the quality of information. This can be accomplished by enhancing science
writing and developing science news clearinghouses. One way to do this is by increasing
scholarships to induce students and young journalists to pursue science writing as a field,
and recognizing and rewarding good science journalism when it occurs. Science
journalists will also need access to knowledgeable and cooperative scientists, and so
science news clearinghouses should be developed to help journalists get reliable
information about risk topics [23]. It is also necessary to reach out to the media to
communicate the issues that nuclear power is dealing with. As public opinion is starting
to shift more toward nuclear power as a clean energy source, the media will be essential
in relaying information about nuclear power to the public, and as such, it falls on the
nuclear power industry to ensure that the media understands the information and is
relaying it correctly. This means working with the media to educate the public and share
information about risks without misinforming the public.
5.4 Focus on Safety and Performance to Restore Trust
Due to the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, the public has
developed a lack of trust in the nuclear industry. Trust takes a very long time to regain
once it is lost. Restoring the public trust will be a long and exhaustive process.
According to Carter [32], "trust will be gained by building a record of sure, competent,
open performance that gets good marks from independent technical peer reviewers and
that shows decent respect for the public's sensibilities and common sense". The focus for
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the nuclear power industry must be on safety, but also on efficient performance.
Fortunately, strong economic performance is closely tied with strong safety performance.
Attention to safety makes plants more reliable. It is not an accident that steadily
improving economic performance is accompanied by fewer scrams, fewer unplanned
shutdowns, and reduced radiation exposure of workers. According to Nesbit, the industry
is already focusing on safety and performance as ways to gain the public's trust. I claim
that the effort will have to be maintained indefinitely, and that a continued focus on
safety and performance will be necessary for the success of any growth of nuclear power
in the future.
5.5 Communication is Imperative
Communication is another aspect that is currently being practiced well in the
industry, but must continue or even expand to improve the public's perception of nuclear
power. Nesbit shared an anecdote showing the level of communication required of the
nuclear power industry: when the mayor of Middletown, PA was asked if he was worried
about what might happen at the nearby nuclear power plant at Three Mile Island, he
responded, "Why should I worry? Not a fish jumps out of the water at Three Mile Island
without my knowing about it." The idea is that no matter how small the detail, the plant
will make sure all of the stakeholders know about it, and this will help to build trust in the
industry. Communication is absolutely essential to keep the public informed and prevent
any irrational fears from taking hold.
That being said, communication is only effective if the communicators understand
their audience and attempt to communicate risk, not just deal with public relations. It is a
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common pitfall of risk communication that the risk managers assume that the public
shares their views of risk. This must be avoided, as it will only show the public that the
risk communicator does not truly understand them. On the other extreme is the public
relations approach, which can be designed to placate the public, and sees them as
ignorant, emotional and superficial, and employs tricks in the presentation such as the
attire of spokesperson and their body language. Risk communication is about more than
just winning over the audience; it is about sharing knowledge and helping the public to
understand the risks associated with the technology.
5.6 Cultivate Support from Environmental Agencies
One of the most promising areas of support for nuclear power is in environmental
agencies that are beginning to look to nuclear power for a clean alternative to fossil fuels.
It is essential that their support is cultivated and that the industry does everything it can to
ensure that it can allay any concerns the environmental groups may have. One of the
biggest concerns is that many groups, including Greenpeace, still group nuclear power
together with nuclear weapons. This thought process must be dispelled. The nuclear
power industry must do everything it can to distance itself from the negative imagery
associated with nuclear weapons, and help to educate the environmental groups on the
differences. The assistance of nuclear industry groups such as CASEnergy and the
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) should be sought in this endeavor. If the nuclear power
industry can gain the support of environmental groups like Greenpeace, previously one of
its biggest opponents, the considerable lobbying power of these groups could be used to
gain public support for nuclear power as a clean sustainable energy source.
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5.7 Encourage Public Participation
Slovic [7] proposes that new approaches to risk management are necessary. He
claims that there are two options: 1) take away public participation and impose more
centralized control as is done with the French nuclear power program, or 2) restore trust
by imposing a degree of openness and involvement with the public that goes beyond
public relations and communication, and employs power-sharing and public participation
in decision-making. It is doubtful that the first option, the French method, would work in
the United States, though the second option has great potential for increasing trust in the
nuclear power industry. As shown in Figure 4, the only event that had any substantial
impact on increasing trust stated, "an advisory board of local citizens and
environmentalists is established to monitor the plant and is given legal authority to shut
the plant down if they believe it to be unsafe" [16]. Forming such an advisory board
would serve two purposes: 1) it would require the members to go through a training or
education program so they can better understand the issues at hand, and 2) it would
empower the community and give them a sense of involvement in the process. While this
option would require the most effort to bring about, it also has the potential for the
greatest positive effect, if conducted properly.
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